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To begin with, as you note in youdiscussion, the notion of substance must be clarified before one int oduces the notion of sub5tantial But it is adlcally mistaken to supppose that thee must be an argument to p ove that substance exists. It is the object of the understanding (and, in a way, of the cogltatiya), just as color is the object of sight. You seem to recognize this in your letter, when you mention "a

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reductio argument based upon Aristotle's Categories." One can

indeed argue that there is substance, but such an argument would

be rather a defense of a principle than a demonstration of a fact, and would quite naturally be a sort of reductio ad absurdum. [I sometimes wonder whether those who find such difficulty in

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granting that substance is a given of experience haven't entirely failed to notice how their children ecognLze and name things, just as they have forgotten the beginnings of their own

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experience For we name things as we know them, and the

names of substances (and substantive nouns) are unive sally the

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first to be used by children. Well, maybe they have no children, or have turned them over to the care of "P ofessionala."l By way

of review, you might take a look at st. Thomas, In *IL* ·Anima,

I lect. x111, nn. 395-398.

The notion of substantial on the other hand,

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requires a certain analysis and argument. Substantial form, when considered universally, is manifested by way of an analogy (i.e. a

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proportion), and that there are such forms is supported by arguments both inductive and deductive.

Let us turn now to the argument for the existence of substance which you offer. It is conclusive, I think, given the

.premises. For if something is in a subject (e.g. red in a

surface), and that subject is in something else (e.g. surface ln

body), and so on, there must still be some first subject --a subject which ls not in a prior subject. For wherever there is an

order of dependence, there must be a first, and I think this is generally granted by all as regards material causality (which is the sort involved here). This is not only because .aterial causality is iapossible to deny --it is undeniably obvious that things depend upon what they are made of-- but also because the matter is a cause both in coming to be and in continuing to be, unlike familiar agents, which seem to be causes of becoming only. Thus, those who investigate constituents of things all agree that there must be priwary constituents, though they disagree about what they are.

However, the den·ials of substance that I am familiar with are not along this line, but rather consist principally of the denial of one of your premises: "the very notion of 'red' iaplies a dependence on soaething which has the color red •••• To quote

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the inimitable Lord Russell: "The •accidents• have no .are need of a substance than the earth has need of an elephant to rest upon." Defense of a first principle must be accommodated to the in

which is is denied.

What is asserted, then, is that what ordinary folk assume to have existence only in a subject, and what the tradition names

"accidents", siaply exist, and do not exist

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in anything 1n

sub1ect. Thus, such things as length, color, heat, and the like

exist, but do not exist in a subject, and we have no reason (they

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say) to suppose that anything exists except what Aristotle calls

the objects of external sense. All the rest is aere

hypothesis and "mind-spinning." So there is a paradox here: what

is denied is accident, not substance, for it is asserted that

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these characteristics are neither in a subject nor of a subject.

Or (put in another way) what is denied here is not substance as it

is defined in Aristotle's categories (for that would be witless),

I but substance understood as a sub1ect *QL* inherence.

How it is worth noting that accident is not denied

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universally, with respect to all the categories. I don't think

that even Russell would maintain that shape, or action, or

movement, or beipg somewhere, exist by themselves, rather than in a subject. Those who assert the subsistence of what had been regarded as accidents usually confine themselves to quantity and

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some of the qualities: e.g. length, volume, point, number, color, heat, smell, and.so forth. Maybe some of them somewhere have noticed that their denial is selective; I can't say, for I don't know "the literature" very well. I wonder what they would make of such qualities as temgerance, or bravery; are there subsistent

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I realities which go by these names, or are there only names here?

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But let us defer for now the question of these

fellows think what they think and say what they say. What might

one say, dialectically, to their position? Three general lines of

argument occur to me.

(1) Logical. If such objects as color and are substantial, none of them could be truly predicated of anything else, except, perhaps, as an essential predicate. For example,

one could say that red is a color, and color is a quality,

and so forth, but one could never say or color of anything else. Thus, how could one interpret such a statement as "blood is red"? Given the position, "blood"

could only name a collection of realities -- ' , shapeless, etc. But one cannot predicate a member of a collection of the collection (or vice versa), nor one member

of the other (e.g. "wet is red"). Further, if "blood" names a collection, what makes it a collection --what is the principle of unity? Do the individuals touch? are they tied together? How can the wet (thing) be red also unless redness and wetness both belong to the same subject?

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Furthermore, predicamental relations would have to be regarded as unreal, for if such relations exist --if

double and a father are anything real-- they cannot be

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thought as existing by themselves. And would be

related?

(2)Physical. There would be no change or becoming of any sort.

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For these need a subject: something is changing when change

occurs, and something is becoming (something) when there is

becoming. Thus, nothing would become red; there would only

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be the non-existence, and then the existence, of red. All

"coming to be" would be from nothing and instantaneous, and

all "passing away" would be instantaneous annihilation.

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(Russell recognizes that this is a consequence of his

position, but, as he would say if he were an American, so

what?) Further, there would be no getting hotter, conceived as a single process --each degree of heat would be something

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totally new, and there would be no thing which gets hotter.

Perhaps, along with this position goes another denial: the denial of all change except change of place. Let it be so; but then, what changes place? ??Sweet? Given all the attributes which are "there", it seems that one must allow that a nearly Infinite multitude of changes are occurring simultaneously. Everything which ordinary thought and the tradition regarded as simply accidents of the mobile subject must now be regarded as a distinct thing, undergoing Its own proper motion. Or else, as argued above, there

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would not really be any such thing as movement, for the red which is now here would not be the same red as was there before the "change of placew.

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(3)From internal experience. It is evident from one's own experience that one suffers , anger, and the like. Both what is alike and what is different in these examples

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bears out the general principle that substance is a spontaneously evident object of understanding. is perceived directly as an affection, now of oneself, now of

another, without inference. But is perceived directly

only in oneself, and as belonging to oneself, while it is

perceived in others only through signs, and anger likewise.

In all these cases, the subject of the affection is as evident to us as the affection itself. On the hypothesis that the object of experience is simply "a cluster of momentary and independent realities", what could a man mean when he says, "I'm thirsty"? If this statement is not the statement of a fact, I do not know what could be.

As regards substantial form, however, the difficulties are more rational. The early Greek naturalists did not deny that

there are such forms; it did not occur to them that there might be such principles. Thus, although one can regard their

positions as implicit denials of substantial forms, the notion of such forms does not arise in their considerations, even as something to be refuted. This is a probable sign that the notion of substantial form is not spontaneously evident, but needs to be reasoned to in some way, perhaps as a conclusion to which one is forced by the evidence. But once it has been proposed by a later philosopher (Aristotle)as an essential principle of generable and corruptible beings, the issues which such a proposal raises cannot be ignored.

You note in your letter that we do not (or otherwise sense) substantial forms. This is quite true if restricted to the sensible , and if one supposes that nothing but the sensible

can bethe object o'f immediate (i.e. unreasoned) knowledge. But this universal negation does away with the knowledge of many things other than substantial form: "I see a man", "I see my brother•, "I see that this is bigger than that". If we are not to rule out all such statements as either mere invention or questionable hypotheses, we must grant that many notions (rationes) are asped without discourse by the internal senses or the intellect, yet not independently, but through the external sense. Memory is a manifest example: we recognize something seen

or imagined as having perceiyed 1n , spontaneously

rather than by step-by-step inference; I hear a piece of music, for example, and immediately recognize it as something 1 have heard before.

What, then, does the tradition mean by "the sensible accidens"? According to St. Thomas:

" ••.ad hoc quod aliquid sit sensibile per accidens, primo requiritur quod accidat ei quod per se est sensibile, sicut accldit albo esse hominem .•.secundo requiritur quod sit apprehensum a sentiente: si enim accideret sensiblli quod lateret sentientem, non diceretur per accidens sentiri. Oportet lgitur quod per se cognoscatur ab aliqua alia potentia cognoscatlva sentlentis ...non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehend! potest in re sens1b111 potest dici sensiblle per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video

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aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam ejus, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere." (Ln *LL* Anima,lect. xiii, nn. 395-396)

So, we may ask: Is substantial form one of such objects,

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.grasped at once by an internal power of knowing --in this case,

the understanding-- and thus something to be elucidated or

defended by argument, but not to be established thereby?

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What follows is my suggestion.

It seems that at least some substantial forms are sensible ac cidens,but not explicitly as substantial forms, but rather

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as intrinsic princioles, and perhaps also as subjects, of certain characteristic properties, movement , or activities found within

I natural things.

Take the most forward example --which you mention in your

letter-- the and in particular, the rational Grant that the 8oul is the substantial form of the living body; is it sensible accidens, and if so, is it apprehended spontaneously

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substantial of that body?The most likely account (I

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think) is this: the soul is apprehended at once, when one \_

encounters a living thing, but not as the substantial form of that t£

thing, but as the intrinsic principle of its vital activities. .

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st. Thomas, in speaking of the science about the soul, says,

"(Haec sciential certa est; hoc enim quilibet experitur in seipso, [ quod scilicet habeat animam, et quod anima vlvificet." <Ln *L*

Anima lect. i, n. 6) "Soul" here does not mean "substantial form" or even "first actuality etc.," but rather "first principle of life within the living". Given this understanding, few (if any) deny that there is a· soul, though they may reject the name. Thus, even mechanistic philosophers, who maintain that the living differs from the non-living only in "scheme and degree of complexity" (a one of them has put it), are not ln fact denying that there is a first principle of life within the living thing; they are simply advancing their own view of what that principle is. They are in the general tradition of Empedocles and his school, who maintained that the soul is a harmony. (For Empedocles realized that not just any proportion in the constituents of living things would result in life, but only some

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--those in which the constituents somehow fit together or could

I act together.)

But if to apprehend the soul as a principle of life is

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spontaneous and undeniable, to see also that it is a substantial

fom is something more, and more difficult, and seems to require

analysis and argument, especially if one is to "nail it down."

This is borne out by Aristotle's procedure in Book One of his Anima. He takes as his point Qf departure that there is a first principle of life within the living, and pursues an inquiry about

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i t is. In this enquiry, he considers a number of opinions, all or most of which he must regard as reasonable, but none of which maintain that the soul is the substantial form of the living thing. The opinion of the atomists (for example) --that the soul is round, smooth atoms-- is not rejected out of hand, and there is no suggestion that it is self-evidently false. So, even if the

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soul is spontaneously apprehended, it is not apprehended as the substantial form of the living body.



How then do we comt to the conclusion thdt some forms are substantial, and that all material substances are composites of

.form and matter? In two ways, it seems to , both of which are

found both in Plato and in Aristotle, though one is more characteristic of the former, and the other of the latter.

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We find that there are many substances which are the same in kind,

though they are different individuals, and that substances come to

be and pass away. Both of these facts of experience (granted that they be such) lead to the conclusion that some forms are substantial.

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Socrates, ae Aristotle says, "was busying hi elf about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions", and "Plato accepted his teaching". (Hetaph. I, 987bl-5) These philosophers were concerned with discovering the one in the many, but not the one material which underlies the temporary forms (as were the early naturaliste), but rather the one or species which allthe particulars share, and from which they receive their common name, in answer to the question "what is it?" A good and familiar

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example is found in especially 72a-73c. This is to recognize a different sort of intrinsic principle --not what a thing is made of, but what makes it what it is, and·answers to the qi.ie-5-tTo\_ii\_ "What--Is-it?"- If one has also een that the common names of existing individuals (such as 'man', 'tree', 'earth') signify they are, and not just some condition or arrangement which they undergo, one has seeo that some forms are substantial --i.e. constitute the very substance of the things they belong to. This, then, is one way of coming to the realization of substantial form.

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The other way of coming to see that there are s1,1h;:sta 1alr--

s through a consideration of substantial chr.-?ge .U tf (: .

substances do indeed come to be and pa5s away, and 1f becoming

universally requires a composite of matter and form, then some forms must be substantial. For a substance cannot be constituted

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by a form which is an accident of what it belongs to. And if *1*

hese two antecedents be granted, and clearly understood, r"do not·"

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think £fiat the phllbsophers would disagree. However, these

antecedents are not always granted, and when they are granted in some way, they are seldom clearly understood.

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From the beginning, or nearly so, philosophers have found themBelves maintaining that substances do not come to be or pass away. The earlier philosophers did not say this in opposition to o\_ther philosophers whose views they thought mistaken, or to

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correct the misadventures of upstart sophists. They realized that what they said was a paradox --contrary to what common


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understanding had always accepted as immediately and undeniably obvious: that not only did substances become different in this way and that, but also came to be and passed away. But in their attempt to understand the givens of experience, they were driven

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to modify these givens in order to accommodate what they

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
considered the only possible explanation of becoming.

Empedocles, among the naturalists, speaks most explicitly to this issue:

There is no origination (physisJ of anything that is mortal, nor yet any end in baneful death, but only mixture and separation of what is mixed; but men call

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this 'origination' (pbysis]..••But when light is mingled with air in human form, or in form like the race of wild beasts or of plants or of birds, then men say that these things have come into beinq, and when they are separated, they call them evil fate. This is the established practice, and I myself also call it so in accordance with the custoa.



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And he also gives his reasons:

I Fools! for they have no far reaching studious thoughts

who think that what was not before comes into being or

that anything dies and perishes utterly.•••For from what

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does not exist at all it ls impossible that anything come

into being, and it is neither possible nor perceivable that being should perish completely; for things will

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always stand wherever. one in each case shall put them. (Does he have kids?J \

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To be sure, Empedocles ooes recognize implicitly that the elementary materials are not sufficient to explain things in their variety and uniqueness, even when combined with those indiscriminate agents and strife.

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The kindly earth received in its broad funnels two parts of gleaming Mestis (water) out of the eight, and four of Hephaestus (fire), and there arose white bones fitted together by the divine gluing of harmony.

' this name 'harmony', Empedocles recognizes that

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compounds in nature require a different of principle --a

principle which Aristotle generalizes under the name 'form' /

lmorphe or eidos). But Eapedoclea does not list this among hisl

principles, probably because it is not a principle of substance,

and because the manifest dependence of accidental forms upon their

subjects prevents him from seeing them as principles. Further,

Empedocles, in common with the other early naturalists, does not

try to first identify the general kinds of principles which

natural becoming and change require, but seeks at once for

something quite specific which can explain everything. Since, \' therefore, he does not conceive that an underlying nature (i.e. v primary matter) qight be anything other than a substance having a definite and actual nature of its own, he cannot come to a

conception of substantial form. Aristotle, on the other hand, refu es to abandon the givens of experience in order to accommodate an explanation, and thus is led to conclude that "the underlying nature is knowable by analogy; for as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless

before receiving form to something which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance and the "this something" and the being." ( . I, 19la7-12) The necessary correlative of this conclusion is that some forms --the forms which are the terms of substantial becoming-- are intrinsic causes and constituents of



-substance, i.e. substantial forms.

You may well remark here that the foregoing is dialectical

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--taking the position of an adversary as he presents it, and showing that there is no need to draw the conclusions he does from

what he has conceded as facts of experience. That is, an account of substantial change is possible, in accord with common experience, and involving no internal contradiction. And such an

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account is Probab le,

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inasmuch as it does not require a

departure from our common understanding of the facts to be explained. And (in confirmation), qiven that substances do. indeed come to be and pass away, what other account has ever been given than thie: that the underlying nature in such becomings has no

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actual nature of its own, and is only potential ther:eto, and that */ r* ..

the forms which it receives cause it both to be and to be what it is? In sum, one may say against the position of Empedocles and --,

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his many (unwitting) modern followers, that their position does not arise from any original doubt (from experience or inferences directly therefrom) but from the failure of their attempts to explain what they (and we) experience --a failure which has led

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. them, not to correct their explanations, but to revise the givens of experience and purge those --whTcfl-a:re-not conformable-to the

I kinds of explanation they allow.

Nevertheless, even if it be granted that the philosophers

who deny substantial change have accommodated the appearances to

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their theories rather than revising their theories to fit the appearances, one may still ask: how firm are our suppositions

here? Are we justified in taking the f.slk.t.. of substantial .change \_..(

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as an immovable starting point for our reasonings? Could we be

.aking the mistake of some of the older astronomers, who assumed

that the eun•s revolution about the earth was an obvious and

I undeniable fact?

Let us begin by gathering together what we have dispersed

above. We had said that a second way of seeing that some forms must be substantial is through a consideration of substantial

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change. Here, it seems to me, there are two crucial premises: (1)that things cannot come to be unless they are composites of matter and form, and (2)that substances come to be and pass away. The former: of these premises is seldom if ever contradicted directly. Another way of stating it is this: if a substance does come to be and pass away, there must be an intrinsic principle

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which compares to it as the 2L music does to the musician (to

take the example from . I, Ch. 7). In other words, given

substantial change, we must generalize our notion of For

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just as our familiar examples of shapes and qualities, insofar as they are 1u a subject, cause it to in some way and to be what

it was not before, so also must there be an intrinsic principle which causes a thing to be simoly, and to be it ls simply (and not just make it be so big or so hQt or so beayy, or

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something of the sort). Otherwise, nothing which is generated could be a real and single substance. But most naturalists do not get this far --so far as to ask o f principle would be required for the coming to be of a substance. They forsake

this question (even though it is the original question) and

.retreat to the theoretically simpler assumption that there is in

truth no substantial becoming. But they cannot do this without

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asserting that nothing generable and corruptible is a substance.)

They must say, with Empedocles, that all such things are only mixtures or incidental arrangements. (I omit here the more v

radical position of Lord Russell and others that there is no such thing as becoming of any sort, so far as we know.)

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The second of these premises --that substances come to be and pass away-- is the one commonly denied, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly. It is clearly the more fundamental of the two; one would never wonder about the principles of substantial change, or ask whether a general account might be given which applies to both it and to accidental change, if one were not convinced that substances do indeed come to be and pass away.

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Accordingly, we ask: how do we become assured of the truth of

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this premise? Is it immediate (an instance of the sensible

accidens which we discussed above}, or rather the conclusion of

an argument? And in either case, from which particular substances

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do we derive our certitude: from any and all equally, or from some

rather than others? (For even if substantial change is an evident

fact in some cases, it may well be obscure and questionable in

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others, such that an attempt to treat all cases in the same way might lead to doubts about what would otherwise be obvious.)

Now it is evident at once that the question of whether / there is substantial becoming reduces to the question of whether among the familiar objects of our experience which we name there are some which are substances. For who would deny that these objects, all or nearly all of them, come to be and pass away? Not only men and brutes and plants, in all of which complexity and contrariety invite corruption, but even relatively simple things like salts and acids and water are undeniably generated and corrupted. So those of us who maintain that substantial change is an evident fact must regard some or most or all of such things as substances. But why do we think so, and is our knowledge

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immediate and of the self-evident (though manifested and defended

by reasonings f ---o-r--·tnf!)

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conclusion of an argument, or (perhaps)

"M;;-- iii-ciEms mai tres", Roman Kocourek and Charles

DeKoninck, used to say that a principal cause of difficulty about the of substantial change is that philosophers tend to examine the least evident cases --those which occur at the elemental or near-elemental level. For at this level of formation, the evidence is the least compelling and the most ambiguous. Given Lavoisier's observations and arguments, it is altogether reasonable to regard water as a substance which is

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generated and corrupted! But ltsmuch more evident that a plant /

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and an animal and a man (above all} are generable and corruptible V

substances. For in these latter cases, even for common experience,

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generation and corruption are undeniable, and the substantiality of the term of becoming is beyond reasonable doubt. Why is this so? And is our understanding in these cases immediate?



Here we must attend both to is experienced , and to

-the in which it is experienced. Since understanding depends

upon sensation, and yet is primarily of substance, what we first grasp in understanding is 1n wbich the perceived attributes exist. (As mentioned above, our basic language testifies to this.) If therefore an experienced object is perceived as a distinct and unique substance, it must be because it has been



shown to be such through the uniqueness of its perceived

attributes. In every case, then, what we perceive is substance

--the "underlying something" at least. But if we also perceive t1nd of substance and 1nd1yidual substance, it must be because the perceived attributes bring us immediately to such an

apprehension, insofar as they are obviously (without argument)

unique and irreducible.

If this is so, it is evident that substantial change is

more known to us in living t..bJng . For here we are more /



certainly aware boh of specific difference and of indiyiduality.v In perceiving the former, we see that we have a different kind of thing ('secondary substance')and not merely another condition in

the same kind of thing; in perceiving the latter, we see that we no longer have the same individual subject ('primary substance'], since what is perceived as the individual has either come to be or passed away.

Thus, as one moves (in thought) from the less perfect to the more perfect, from the simple to the complex, from the non­

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u living to the living, from plant to animal to man, it becomes more and more difficult to explain the peculiarities of a being from

its material constituents and their arrangement --or from the kind and degree of perfection existing at a lower level. And this much is universally conceded. For exa•ple, the biological dispute between the 'mechanists• and the 'vitalists' about the proper principle of life has no counterpart in physics or chemistry, and the "origin of species", as it Is argued or conjectured regarding/ simpler forms of life is far less controversial than the "descent of man". Even those who assume as a matter of principle that the reduction of the higher to the lower is possible realize that reduction becomes harder and harder as one studies the higher forms. The situation here is similar to that which obtains



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for the premise that n?ture acts for an end; it is only in

t n s that this premise is unmistakeably obvious, and those who

wish to pu n question recognize tha eir primary task is to

I explain ving things adequately without this premise.

Likewise, one is re certainly aware of the individual inl

living things, especially in the higher living things. This

simple fact of experience is somewhat obscured by plausible

theories which appeal to an abstract imagination. For since

living things are the most complex, and since a complex consists of many units, it seems that a living thing is least of all a

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w unit. The ,·}imagination ,can only represent a complex (explicitly)

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as an actually divided multitude, and cannot at once also represent it (if indeed it ever can) as a single being with its own unique integrity. To the extent, then, that the naturalist resolves his arguments to the picture in his imagination, he can never regard the composite as anything other than an arrangement

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l ·of distinct entitles.

But if one looks back beyond these imaginary representa­ tions, and consults the direct experiences which stand at the beginning of natural philosophy, quite a different reality comes into view. We then see that the ver concept of individuality

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a \_ises from our 'tnterna experience of unity. (In ordi-nary usage,

"an individual" means "an individual man".) This experience does

not arise in spite of the distinction and spatial separation of our bodily parts, but in our very experience . - e sensation) of



these bodily parts. For they are perceived pa rts, as we experlence varlous passions wlthin them. Andt.b-1--s-- lnternal experience of them as parts fits with our external experience

that they tQ as parts. There is a perfect harmony between what one experiences in oneself (and in others, by signs) and what one observes in the coming to be and passing away of others.

From this one can see that the views of many moderns arise from a false abstraction and an arbitrary selection from the evidence. They take the notion of individuality, which they (and we) have derived from an experience of themselves as living beings, and apply lt exclusively to certain hypothetical, imaginary entitles ("atoms"), while denying or forgetting that those very things from which they derived their notion are individual . At the sa time, they make the question of whether there truly is substantial change depend upon those cases (the elemental and near-elemental) where the evidence that something

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different 1n has cometo be is most obscure and questionable. \

And further, is lt not evident that as one descends (in thought) \



from the animal to the plant to the mineral the individual becomes

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more and more difficult to discern? How much water is one water? And is a rock one thing, or more likely a cluster?

You observe: "But this kind of argument does not show that every mobile being has a substantial form." Well, yes and no. If the mobile being comes to be and passes away, and if it is an individual of a kind, it must have such a form, given what we have argued above. But whether all or most of those chemical changes which we obscurely witness are substantial, and whether everything which has a stable name (e.g. 'brine') is a substance, are questions quite distinct from the question of whether there are substantial changes at all. To be able to discern that something occurs does not depend upon the ability to judge in every particular instance whether that something has occurred. I know that men tell lies --that is a fact beyond question; but does that mean that I can judge with certainty whether what you just said

was a lie or not? Here it is enough to see at first that living things, which are manifestly substantial, come to be and pass away

--this establishes the fact of substantial change, and brings us

to recognize that at least in these cases thez:e must be forms which are substantial. But implicit in this recognition is

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another: that the simpler substances which go to make up living things must also be generable and corruptible, for they could not otherwise become a single, specifically unique (living) being unless they were substantially corruptible, and thus composed of matter and substantial form.

The view of Locke that you cite seems to be one of those all too common examples of a theorist maintaining a position in spite of the evidence rather than because of it. It's been a while since I've had to consider Locke in detail, and pay attention to the particulars which lend support to his position, so I'm probably not doing him justice. Nevertheless (to concentrate on just one assertion)# to say that "each material being is a bundle of accidents residing or inhering in a

substantial subject or matter, but with no substantial form" is to

leave unexplained the "bundle"> What, one may ask# is the

principle of unity here? And can one reasonably regard this unity

as an accident, given that it ls persistent and recurrent? Like

Lord Ru sell, who regards the "material thing" as just a "bundle of events", but neglects to tell us what makes the bundle a

bundle, the position you cite simply regards the presence of all

these co-ordinated properties (e.g. reason and the power of speech

and the vocal chords and hearing and memory) as a fact for which

no account need be given --i.e. as an accident for which there is

no cause in the things we see. It is no better than the

position which holds that purposeful behavior in living things is \

an accident, and then tries to conceal the paradox (for what could

'accident' mean, once the universal and consistent has been called

"accidental"?) in myriads of imaginary variations.

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